This chapter traces the long-run development of Genuine Savings (GS) using a panel of eleven countries during the twentieth century. This panel covers a number of developed countries (Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland, France, the US, and Australia) as well as a set of resource-abundant countries in Latin America 
Introduction
Over the past quarter-century, Genuine Savings (GS henceforth), or Adjusted Net Savings (ANS), has emerged as an important indicator of sustainable development. It is based on the concept of wealth accounting, and it is argued that it addresses shortcomings in conventional metrics of economic development by incorporating broader measures of saving and investment (Hamilton and Hepburn, 2014; Stiglitz et al., 2009 ).
1 GS measures year-on-year changes in total capital stocks (physical, natural, social, institutional & human) . Following the pioneering studies of Pearce and Atkinson (1993) and Hamilton (1994) , the World Bank has published estimates of GS from the mid-1990s to the present World Bank (2011 Bank ( , 1997 Bank ( , 2015 . Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and World Bank (2006 Bank ( , 2011 illustrate the nature of these estimates for almost all countries in the world and show how a negative GS indicator can be interpreted as a signal of unsustainable development. Current World Bank GS data at the country level stretches back to the 1970s, and provides empirical evidence of the level of sustainable/unsustainable economic development throughout the world: 2 the recent 2013 global average GS rate was 8.35 per cent of Gross National Income, however there was considerable variation in the data with values ranging from -49.89 to 36.41 per cent of Gross National Income.
The question of sustainability is inherently about scale. Should our focus be on a global, national or local scale? The World Bank publishes national indicators of sustainability, but arguably it is global sustainability that is a more pressing concern given that issues such as climate change are caused by global externalities.
The issue of scale is at the centre of Pezzey and Burke (2014) who seek to understand why national GS indicators (generally positive) give conflicting signals compared to alternative ecological based indicators of sustainability (overwhelmingly negative). Their answer lies in how pollution damages (primarily carbon) were accounted for. Rather than using literature derived prices they instead re-estimate the underlying DICE models and derive new estimates of the social costs of carbon prices. They find that models assuming future CO 2 emissions are controlled lead to indicators of sustainability not too dissimilar from the World Bank, whilst the business as usual assumption leads to an indicator of unsustainability. While global estimates may be the ideal to gauge sustainability paths, economic and environmental policy are designed and implemented at the national level. Therefore we follow the Pezzey and Burke (2014) paradigm and aggregate national measures of GS to construct aggregate "global" indicators of sustainability and incorporate global externalities, mainly CO 2 emissions, in this calculation but we also present national indicators, excluding the global pollutants, so that comparison can be made both between countries and with components of the global estimate.
witnessed the Great Depression and the re-introduction of trade barriers. The Second World War was another shock to the international economy. In the post-WWII period we see a gradual return to freer trade and integration in commodity markets. The period from 1970-2000 is also the backdrop of the 'curse of natural resources' whereby Sachs and Warner (2001) ; Sachs (1999) found a negative correlation between the share of primary exports in GDP and future GDP growth; countries in Latin America were seen as the prime exemplars of this (Sachs, 1999) .
The economic development of Latin America has been a recurrent topic in twentieth century economic history, especially in the debate about divergence and convergence (Bértola and Ocampo, 2012) . At the outset of the twentieth century Argentina and Chile had GDP per capita levels comparable to some European states, such as France or Germany, yet by the end of the millenium there was significant divergence (Bolt and van Zanden, 2014) . There are several reasons behind divergence in the inter-war period ; however, recent studies point out the extenuation of an economic model based on natural resources exports and lack of productive diversification (Tafunell and Ducoing, 2015) . In the post WWII period there is still debate surrounding the effects of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). The strong growth performance of larger countries, such as Mexico or Brazil, which stood in contrast to the poorer growth rates exhibited by the southern cone region (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), opened a discussion on the gains and losses of this economic policy (Gómez-Galvarriato and J.G., 2009) , and the timing of the divergence between Latin America and the developed world Prados de la Escosura (2009). In direct relation to this debate and the aim of this chapter, natural resource prices have played a key role in Latin American development. Latin American economic thought after the Second World War was strongly influence by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (secular deterioration in primary commodity prices relative to manufactured goods). The current extenuation of the so-called "supercycle" has increased worries about the region's economic future.
Our headline results (table 1 & figure 1) show that, in general, the aggregate global GS measure was positive. We find that all countries were on a positive development path in terms of physical capital accumulation. When more comprehensive savings indicators are used, we find that natural resource depletion lowers saving rates in resource abundant economies considerably, and results in negative saving rates in some Latin American countries. We find that the accumulation of intangible assets plays an increasingly important role, especially for leading Western economies during the second half of the twentieth century. The share of intangible assets has constantly increased ever since, constituting the most important single contributing factor to wealth accumulation in the majority of countries in our panel by the end of the twentieth century.
Genuine Savings as indicator of sustainability
The economics of Sustainable Development (SD) is traditionally based on capabilities-based or outcomebased definitions of what constitutes SD. The capabilities-based approach views a sustainable development path of an economy as one where the (per capita) real values of changes in capital stocks are non-negative (i.e. constant or increasing). Whereas the means-based approach views a sustainable development path as one where utility or consumption per capita is non-declining (Hanley et al., 2015) . Furthermore, what constitutes sustainable development also depends on how one perceives total capital, one version being that SD requires non-declining total wealth (weak sustainability) and another where SD requires non-declining natural capital (strong sustainability). The first approach assumes perfect substitutability between different types of capital and that natural capital can be valued using monetary values. Whereas the latter approach sees natural capital as having critical thresholds and that a decrease in a physical unit of natural capital cannot be replaced by an increase in the quantity of other forms of capital. As the degree of substitutability is difficult to establish empirically (i.e. Markandya and Pedroso-Galinato (2007) ), how one chooses to approach sustainable development, from a weak or strong perspective, is a matter of preference based on values.
Moreover, this dichotomy is in some respects a false because if a country fails a weak sustainability test it will in all likelihood also fail a strong test as well.
Using the definition of sustainable development from the Brundtland Report, 4 the weak approach to sustainability links future well-being with changes in wealth (or capital stocks) (Pearce, 2002) . The theoretical underpinnings of the neoclassical approach to weak sustainability are now well established.
5
The underlying logic is that future consumption can be seen as a form of interest on past wealth accumulation, since the productive basis, i.e. labour, physical and intangible capital, are the productive forces used to generate income. The GS approach to sustainability rests firmly on the so-called Hartwick Rule (Hartwick, 1977) , as this shows how consumption can be constant over time by re-investing rents from natural resource extraction into other forms of capital (i.e. man-made or human). One of the attractions of the GS is that, under certain assumptions, it can be used to assess both the capabilities-based and the outcome-based approaches to Sustainable Development (Hanley et al., 2015) . Another attraction is that it is firmly grounded in the system of national accounts (SNA) framework and can be used to measure and compare countries in a consistent manner.
Over the past 25 years there have been a series of GS estimates for a host of countries. The time period covered by most estimates range from the 1970s to the present (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; World Bank, 4 Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisations on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs' (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p.43) .
5 See Hanley et al. (2015) for a comprehensive review.
2011), although a number of studies have calculated GS for shorter (Pezzey et al., 2006; Mota and Domingos, 2013; Ferreira and Vincent, 2005; Pezzey and Burke, 2014; Ferreira and Moro, 2011) and longer horizons Lindmark and Acar, 2013; Greasley et al., 2014; Hanley et al., 2016; Rubio, 2004) . Studies have tended to trade off scale and scope, with studies focusing on individual countries being richer in data quality but not directly comparable with other country-specific studies. Definitions of metrics have also varied with 'green' and 'genuine' savings measures commonly constructed and used interchangeably. 6 Technological change has been an important concept in the theoretical literature (e.g. (Weitzman, 1997; Pemberton and Ulph, 2001) , but there are a number of challenges incorporating a measure of technological change into empirical studies.
7
A number of studies have attempted to address this and have have used TFP growth as an indicator of technological progress and incorporated this into the genuine savings framework through the net present value of TFP's contribution to future GDP growth (Pezzey et al., 2006; Mota and Domingos, 2013; Greasley et al., 2014) .
There have been a number of empirical tests of the theoretical properties of GS and its link with future consumption and in general the evidence tends to be supportive of the predictive power of GS. For example, Ferreira and Vincent (2005) , Ferreira et al. (2008) and World Bank (2006) find a positive correlation between GS and the present value of future changes in consumption. Similarly, using the same testing structure, there is also evidence of a longer-run relationship between GS and future changes in well-being (real wages & consumption per capita), although here the results suggest that the choice of time horizon and discount rate has the greatest effect on the estimated parameters Hanley et al., 2016) .
Another issue with current empirical indicators is the treatment of international trade flows. For example, countries heavily reliant on the export of natural resources can be deemed to have negative genuine savings whilst countries importing the said natural resources will have positive genuine savings as they are not consuming their "national" natural capital. Atkinson et al. (2012) explore this importing/exporting of sustainability using input-output models to assess the trade flows of countries, they find a clear trend of countries production of natural resources (i.e. extraction) being much less than their consumption. Moreover, changing trade patterns in recent years have seen a shift in manufacturing from developed to developing countries and this is reflected in a shift in emissions, for example European CO 2 emission reductions were as much a result of structural changes as they were due to environmental policy (Emission Trading Scheme).
9
In a sense, this links back to the literature on the "pollution haven hypothesis", i.e. tightening environmental regulation or changes in preferences for environmental goods can lead to an outsourcing of pollution to other areas with lower environmental regulatory standards or preferences. These are issues of extreme relevance for the current paper, whilst we do not have the data to observe trade patterns over time or CO 2 flows, by scaling up to a "global" level we can attempt to reduce some of the limitations that these trade flows may induce in our estimates.
Data and methodology
We have largely followed the World Bank (2011 Bank ( , 2006 
10
An important component of GS is net investment, including overseas investment, which reflects changes in a country's physical assets.
11
In a previous study of Latin American 'Green' investment over the period 1973 -1986 , Vincent (2001 lamented the quality of conventional measures of reproducible capital in Latin American countries. In order to overcome this concern, we make use of new capital stock estimates for Latin American Tafunell and Ducoing (2015) .
To account for the depletion of natural (renewable and non-renewable) resources we subtracted the rent from the depletion of natural resources, using gross revenues minus average costs of depletion, from net investment.
12
For European countries, the bulk of gross revenues from resource extraction originate from the 10 See data appendix for a full list of data sources by country. 11 These data were readily available for various countries, but for some countries we estimated net investment using gross investment and consumption of fixed capital, or simply annual depreciation of assets (see appendix for a detailed list of sources used). 12 We used the market value of extracted renewables and non-renewable resources as well as the extracted quantities to compute the gross revenues. The average extraction costs were estimated using labour requirement and the average wage of labourers. Similarly, estimates of the value of the change in timber stocks by country was based on changes in area covered with forests, the average quantity of timber per m 3 and the market value of timber. For more recent periods the FAO (2010) provides estimates on the cubic quantities of timber on a given surface area; it is likely that applying this methodology on historical periods overestimates historical forest stocks since we implicitly assume than the high modern tree planting density has existed throughout the period under observation. extraction of coal, and for more recent times from oil and natural gas (Great Britain). We also considered other resources, but the quantities by and large are negligible compared with the accumulation of other assets. For the US and Australia, two resource abundant developed nations, we included data on coal, oil and gas as well as metal and mineral ores, as well as changes in forestry. For Latin American countries, resources considered include metal and mineral ores and fossil fuels. Important sources of natural capital depletion are petroleum (Argentina, Colombia, Mexico), gold (Brazil, Colombia), silver (Colombia), coal (Brazil) and copper (Chile).
Education expenditure is used to proxy the accumulation of human capital to obtain a more inclusive measure of a country's assets. Admittedly there are limitations to this approach as it is known that education does not perfectly equate with human capital, however, alternatives measurements of human capital stocks, such as discounted life-time earnings, are not available for all countries over the whole of our sample.
Furthermore, an additional limitation of this approach is that education expenditure as a proxy for human capital accumulation makes no allowances for appreciation of (e.g. on-the-job training & experience) and depreciation (aging & mortality) of human capital. Moreover, this approach does not account for international migration whereby migrant recipients benefit from the human-capital embodied in immigrants and developing countries may experience losses in human capital through emigration.
We added a proxy for the accumulation of technology to take into account intangible assets as suggested by Weitzman (1997) .Weitzman suggests that this adjustment may be in the region of 40 per cent of Net National Product. Thus, omitting a technological progress measure would mis-state the degree of sustainability of an economy. In relation to technological progress, although many of the general purpose technologies were invented in the late nineteenth century (telephone, electricity, combustion engine), it was not until the twentieth century that they were adopted en masse and in many cases this meant the use of new natural resources that had been overlooked in the past (oil and natural gas for example) but in turn this lead to more efficient use of resources (e.g. improvements in fuel efficiency) e.g. see Gordon (2016) . Therefore, we have incorporated the effects of exogenous technological progress in our measure of GS by including the present value of TFP growth. We calculate TFP assuming a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with capital and labour measured in man-hours.
Where Y equals income, L is labour (measured in man hours) and K is the capital stock. A denotes TFP which is estimated as a residual from this calculation. Trend TFP was used to estimate the value of exogenous technological progress. Following Pezzey et al. (2006) and Greasley et al. (2014) we calculate the present value of future changes in trend TFP over a 20 year time horizon. This is done to capture the uncertainty over the duration of the value of technological progress.
13
TFP is a central piece of the puzzle to assess 13 Arrow et al. (2012, table 3) incorate a measure of TFP but do so by adding the current TFP growth rate to the per capita growth rate of Total (Comprehensive) Wealth. However, this approach only adds 1 year and does not take account of the value of time as an sustainable development; this metric, however, is somewhat in conflict with other components of GS. TFP is related to innovativeness, intangible assets, institutions and social capital, and as a consequence the incorporation of TFP brings the risk of 'double-counting' the effects equally associated with technology and human capital. Baier et al. (2006) find that incorporating a measure of human capital reduces the size of the residual; Similarly, Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) argue that better measurements of human capital quantity and quality can further reduce TFP. There is therefore reason to believe that the overlap between human capital accumulation and the value of technology accumulation leads to a slight overestimation of total capital formation. Data limitations and availability prevent us from fully disentangling human capital and technology. We therefore opt to incorporate an unadjusted TFP series in our estimates, however, in the results section we illustrate the effect of TFP appended to Green investment to avoid the possibility of double counting as education expenditure is included in GS.
Lastly, we incorporate a range of prices related to damages from carbon dioxide emission in our global estimates. Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas (GHG) with lifetime of up to 200 years in the atmosphere and accounts for 75 per cent of global warming potential Stern (2007, table 8.1) . The crucial factor is that it is a stock pollutant in that the annual emissions add to the existing concentration in the atmosphere and each unit of emissions increases the marginal damage cost of the pollutant in the future .
To account for CO 2 in our sustainability indicator we used the total amount of carbon dioxide emitted and estimates of the social costs of carbon derived from the wider literature. There are a range of price estimates that we have incorporated, such as the constant $20 tonne carbon cost of the World Bank metric, $29 t/c from Tol (2012) , $110 t/c from the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) . However, the results presented below purposely utilise the more recent estimates of the social cost of carbon by Pezzey and Burke (2014) . The first price, $131 t/c, estimated from a DICE model recalibrated to assume that it is economically optimal to control emissions such that warming may be limited to an agreed target of 2 • C and a significantly higher price of $1455 t/c which assumes that no controls of CO2 emissions are implemented. We choose to highlight these contrasting prices as our study shares similarities with Pezzey and Burke (2014) in that we also attempt to determine if the world is on a "global" sustainability path. These prices are discounted over time as suggested by Tol (2012) and as illustrated by . 14 A limitation of the construction of GS as outlined above is that it only covers quantifiable indicators that can be approximately expressed in monetary units. Thus GS overlooks non-market environmental goods and services and as a result the GS metric excludes developments in other pollutants such SO2 and NOx, and developments in biodiversity and ecosystem services. Historical estimates of SO2 and biodiversity uncontrolled capital stock. The choice of 20 years follows Pezzey et al. (2006) and Greasley et al. (2014) . Using the case of Argentina as an example, where the present value of TFP is 10.12 per cent over 20 years, if a shorter hoirzon (10 years) is used this is reduced to 8.45 per cent of GDP and if a longer horizon (30 years) is used this increases to 15.87 per cent of GDP. Therefore, by chosing a 20-year horizon we err on the side of underestimation of the value of technological progress.
14 For a more comprehensive overview of data sources used see the data appendix as well as Blum et al. (2013) , Camacho (2014) , Greasley et al. (2014) , Greasley et al. (2016) , Höfeler (2014) , Klenk (2013) and Mennig (2015) .
are available but these indicators are difficult to incorporate in an augmented long-run GS metric until a compromise estimate of their economic value over time is obtained. The absence of monetary evaluations of these phenomena, however, cannot hide the fact that economic growth seems to adversely affect biodiversity and levels of pollution. The global output of SO2 increased throughout the twentieth century, with the major share of SO2 being emitted in North America, followed by Western Europe. Total global SO2 emissions rapidly rose after World War Two, and peaked around 1980. During the late twentieth century, mainly environmental regulation combined with fuel-saving technologies and a transition away from fuels with a high-sulphur content helped to lower global SO2 output (Stern and Kaufmann, 1996) . Losses in biodiversity are largely the result of changes in land use; the increasing demand for grazing and cropland has encouraged deforestation which in turn resulted in losses in biodiversity. Estimates on the development of biodiversity suggests that Latin America and the US, and the majority of the world's countries experienced losses in biodiversity whereas some countries in Western Europe saw stagnating or even increases in biodiversity. 15 Any future evaluation of the costs of biodiversity loss and SO2 emissions will lower any sustainability indicator (see Goldewijk (2014) for an overview).
Trends in Genuine Savings through 20th Century
Trends in "Global" GS per capita are presented in figure 1 whilst Table 1 presents mean results as a as a share of GDP. The aforementioned debate on national versus global measures of sustainability has been addressed by estimating a comprehensive measure which incorporates all the countries in this study (Pezzey and Burke, 2014 ). In the "Global GS" indicator we also take account of the CO2 prices outlined by Pezzey and Burke (2014) . These CO2 prices are particularly higher than other estimates in the literature (e.g. Tol (2012) and thus adds a significant negative premium on fossil fuel based growth, especially the significantly higher 'business as usual' price. As a counterpoint to these results, a CO 2 of $20 t/c or $29 t/c has a trivial impact on our metrics and result in metrics that are effectively no different from the "Green" metric presented below.
The full panel of countries account for approximately half of the world's GDP by 1950 (Maddison, 2001) , and allow us to throw a glance at the degree of weak sustainability over the period of observation. The global GS figure reflects naturally a mix of country-specific experiences. For example, while some belligerents experienced negative saving rates during the First World War, other countries were largely unaffected by it. As a result, global GS during the First World War does not suggest a deterioration of global wealth accumulation. Conversely, negative effects associated with the Great Depression and the Second World Data appendix table 3 and table 4 War are clearly visible in the global GS figure; these two periods were the only episodes in the twentieth century when the world experienced substantial losses of wealth. In the aftermath of the Second World War, global GS recovered quickly, rising to unprecedented levels in the 1970s. Starting with the economic depression in the 1980s, GS decreased to somewhat lower levels, but remained to be consistently high in historical perspective. Although towards the end of our sample represents a declining share of global GDP (40 per cent by 1990) and thus weakens the global representativeness of our findings. In a counterfactual study of how much countries would be wealthier in terms of fixed capital if they followed the Hartwick Rule and reinvested in fixed capital, Hamilton et al. (2006) illustrate the possibility of unbounded and rising consumptionif a GS rate of at least 5 per cent of GDP was maintained over time. Hamilton et al. (2006) 's finding provides us with a yardstick with which to assess the performance of our global metric from a sustainability perspective in terms of its capacity for raising consumption over future generations. For our 'global' indicator, Table 1 shows that net investment is overwhelmingly positive which indicates that rents were reinvested in the productive capacities. However, in terms of Green investment, this is considerably lower and over the whole century this is below the 5% prescribed threshold outlined by Hamilton et al. (2006) . When CO 2 damages are accounted for this suggests a worse performance and although this metric is not negative, CO 2 damages are large and rising over the 20th century and are likely to increase in the future. Our GS indicator, which includes education expenditure, returns our sustainability indicator towards a sustainability path and GSTFP even more so. The message appears to be clear, the 20th century shows that overall the Hartwick Rule was followed but worries about the legacy of CO 2 emissions are clearly evident. CO 2 damages clearly indicate a path towards lower "green savings". Yet, taking a sanguine view, if we continue to adopt technological solutions we may continue on a sustainable development path.
The data presented in Table 2 Only during the 1970s and early 1980s, Australia experienced increases in GS. The global recession of the early 1980s is also visible in the development of GS; Great Britain and the United States experienced the largest decline in GS during this period.
In figure 2 we present the augmented GS estimate, which captures changes in the value of technology in an economy in addition to conventional GS. During the first half of the 20th century, we find that a large share of wealth is generated through the accumulation of technology, not through conventional GS. The upper trend in each country diagram reports the level of Genuine Savings including the present value of future changes in technology. This development is reinforced during the second half of the 20th century, when technology becomes a large contributor to wealth accumulation. In the United States, Great Britain and Germany, technology becomes the largest single contributor to wealth accumulation during this period.
By 1950, augmented GS in these three countries is three to four times larger than the conventional GS metric.
In France and Australia, technology also plays an important role with respect to wealth accumulation, but levels of GS and augmented GS are evidently lower than in the US, Great Britain and Germany. Switzerland, again, shows some atypical patterns regarding the role of accumulation of intangible assets. Swiss GS and augmented GS increased rapidly during the 20th century, but this increase seems to be the result of physical capital accumulation; the present value of future changes in technology appears to remain almost constant across time.
Results for Latin America suggest that net investment during the twentieth century was somewhat lower compared with Western countries' wealth accumulation. However, net investment was considerable in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, almost reaching Western levels (table 2) 
Conclusions
This study provides estimates of the development of a series of 'Global' and national savings metrics using a panel of eleven countries in the course of the twentieth century. We compare net investment, GS, and an augmented GS measure that considers the value of technology, to assess the degree of weak sustainability of these countries. We find that GS were mostly positive during this period and increased substantially during in the early 1980s. However, we find that the treatment of CO2 and how it is priced has an enormous impact on the sustainability signal (Pezzey and Burke (2014) . The two prices shown, the high 'business as usual' and the lower 'control', highlight the messages embodied in their assumptions: if there are no attempts to control emissions into the future, then the twentieth century was a century built on unsustainable practices; if, however, the damaging potential of uncontrolled emissions are accepted and these emissions are optimally 'controlled', then the development seen in the twentieth century can be determined to have been on a sustainable path. Only time can tell. Why do these events matter? The results presented in this chapter have strong implications for the present and future economic development of the countries considered in this study. A number of studies argue that consumption is a function of (previous) capital accumulation, since the productive basis, i.e. labour, physical and intangible capital, are the productive forces used to generate income. The lessons from these studies are straightforward: current investment in physical capital, intangible assets such as human capital and technology may result in higher consumption, wages and well-being in the future. Likewise, erosion of the productive basis due to depreciation of assets, pollution and depletion of natural resources may limit, or even reduce, future well-being. The implications of this perspective for the 'global' economy are clear; in order to ensure future sustainability the Hartwick Rule ought to be followed and technological progress, i.e. an increasingly intelligent use of existing assets, can play an immense role in future sustainability, especially taking into account the future development of the new economic giants of twenty-first century (i.e. China and India). (1997) and Diebolt and Jaoul-Grammare (2008) . Education expenditure is provided by Diebolt (1995 Diebolt ( , 2000 .
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